summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-23 12:15:48 +0900
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-23 12:15:48 +0900
commit897473fc040fd69e9a4a6da2ac62a4724a4a8619 (patch)
tree04055fca343e99164548cb38271bec0fae7c2673
parent3aa536d9aafc2806dd3439114e25b253086312a9 (diff)
parentacddc72015e5bc8f640b02d38b36afd7841c9c14 (diff)
downloadlinux-897473fc040fd69e9a4a6da2ac62a4724a4a8619.tar.gz
linux-897473fc040fd69e9a4a6da2ac62a4724a4a8619.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull key handling fixes from James Morris: "Quoting David Howells: Here are three miscellaneous fixes: (1) Fix a panic in some debugging code in PKCS#7. This can only happen by explicitly inserting a #define DEBUG into the code. (2) Fix the calculation of the digest length in the PE file parser. This causes a failure where there should be a success. (3) Fix the case where an X.509 cert can be added as an asymmetric key to a trusted keyring with no trust restriction if no AKID is supplied. Bugs (1) and (2) aren't particularly problematic, but (3) allows a security check to be bypassed. Happily, this is a recent regression and never made it into a released kernel" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: KEYS: Fix for erroneous trust of incorrectly signed X.509 certs pefile: Fix the failure of calculation for digest PKCS#7: Fix panic when referring to the empty AKID when DEBUG defined
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c2
3 files changed, 8 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
index 6a76d5c..9492e1c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -124,5 +124,10 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
- return ctx->digest ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ctx->digest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 44b746e..2ffd697 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
goto found_issuer_check_skid;
}
- } else {
+ } else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index ac4bddf..19d1afb9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
- return 0;
+ return -ENOKEY;
if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;